This paper analyzes the eect of the average level of intelligence on dierent measures of the quality of institutions, using a 2006 cross-sectional sample of 113 countries. The results show that average IQ positively aects all the measures of institutional quality considered in our study, namely government eciency, regulatory quality, rule of law, political stability and voice and accountability. The positive eect of intelligence is robust to controlling for other determinants of institutional quality. It follows that countries with higher IQ levels enjoy institutions of better quality than countries with low levels of IQ. This nding should by no means be interpreted as evidence that there exist some countries with more intelligent populations that build better institutions and some other countries with less intelligent populations that build poor institutions. What our nding points out to is the fact that a country's level of the understanding of the rules and principles that govern the institutions and the degree of cooperation of its human capital within national institutions is important for institutional quality.
Introduction
Numerous studies have documented the eect of national IQs not only on economic growth, but also on an important range of phenomena (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2012) .
Beside its direct eect on economic growth (Whetzel and McDaniel, 2006; Jones and Schneider, 2006, 2010; Weede and Kämpf, 2002) , intelligence has signicant eect on other factors that directly aect economic growth, such as corruption (Potrafke, 2012) and governance (Kodila-Tedika, 2012) , and therefore indirectly aect economic growth. This paper analyzes the eect of national IQs on government institutions. We argue that institutional quality serves as a channel through which intelligence aect economic growth. Specically, high population IQ improves institutional quality and positively aects economic growth through high-quality government institutions. The following measures of institutional quality are considered: government eectiveness/eciency, political stability, and regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability. We nd that, after controlling for other determinants of institutional quality, national IQ positively aects each of the ve measures of institutional quality.
We start by submitting that running institutions requires understanding the principles that rule them in order to produce a high quality outcome. This fact allows to put forth our motivation of studying the eect of intelligence on national institutions. First, intelligence is positively related to patience that accompanies the learning process and that allows players in the institutions to have a better understanding of the principles and rules that govern them. Second, as group cognitive skills have more meaningful eect on national outcome than individual intelligence, national IQ captures the level of cooperation within the institutions in order to produce the outcomes that are nationally ecient. In fact, one of the aims of modern institutions in to support pro-market policies. In this vein, high IQ level is expected to have a positive eect on institutions since high IQ individuals appear more likely to support pro-market and pro-trade policies (Caplan and Miller, 2010) that are implemented within the national institutions.
In the institutional setting, IQ is understood to capture the level of national ability to understand the principles and rules that govern national institutions and to orient their structure toward pro-market and pro-trade policies, with the ultimate objective of beneting the general population. However, it is reasonable to think of a reverse feedback eect from institutions to intelligence. In the same way that the exposure to some elements of the natural environment has been documented to have an impact on intelligence (Armor, 2004; Wang et al., 2007; Solon et al., 2008) , national institutions may be thought to create an environment that inuence national intelligence. However, the question of the channels through which institutions can inuence IQ is crucial. It can be submitted that by creating an appropriate environment, institutions are able to allow talents to develop and thus to increase population IQ. The education system and the health system are such channels through which governmental institutions can positively inuence national IQ outcomes. For example, it is possible to raise IQ with sound public health policies and an excellent education (Armor, 2004) .
A model that aims at explaining the eect of national intelligence on the quality of the institutions would logically account for the feedback eect from the ability of government institutions to create an environment that promotes national intelligence. However, doing so will account only for part of the factors that may aect cognitive abilities. For example, it is not possible to disentangle the negative eect of the exposure to arsenic and uoride and the possible positive eect resulting from an appropriate environment created by sound public health policies and an excellent educational system. A good education system can trivially inuence IQ by exposing students to the cultural referents common in some IQ tests. But, as pointed out by Jones (2011) , such increases are rarely of interest to psychologists and economists. It is important to mention that neglecting such eects when they are signicant may lead to an inaccurate assessment of the relationship between institutions and IQ levels. However, the main question is whether this makes any dierence at all. We shall run regressions in this paper by rst considering the unidirectional eect from IQ levels to institutional quality and then considering the feedback eect from institutional quality to intelligence.
The paper is organized in six sections, including this introduction. The second section focuses on a graphical analysis and on the results from simple regressions of the relationship between each of the ve measures of institutional quality and national IQ.
The empirical model is discussed in section 3 and regression results are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the ndings while section 6 concludes.
A graphical Analysis
Figures 1 and 2 portray the relationship between each of the ve measures of institutional quality (y-axis) and IQ (x-axis) for the countries included in our sample.
In Figure 1 , government eectiveness/eciency is plotted against IQ. It follows that countries with higher IQ enjoy higher government eectiveness. We also represent the tted line for the simple regression model Ge i = α + βIQ i + i where Ge is government eectiveness/eciency. The estimated coecient for β is positive (+0.060) and strongly signicant (p-value = 0.000), showing that high IQ improve government eciency. However, institutional quality cannot solely be explained by average IQ, and the relationship between the two variables cannot be claimed only based on the above simple regression results. Our aim is to show that the signicant relationship between each of the considered measures of institutional quality and average IQ does remains signicant and robust when we control for other factors. To do so, we shall next specify and estimate a model that accounts for other determinants of institutional quality.
Empirical Model
We estimate the following empirical model:
where IQI i is the institutional quality index for country i, IQ i is its average IQ, Z = (z 1 , z 1 . . . z k ) is the vector of control variables, and i is the error term that is assumed to be normally and independently distributed. Finally, α is the intercept, β captures the eect of average IQ on institutional quality while δ = (δ 1 , , δ 2 , . . . , δ k ) is the parameter vector for the control variables. Our parameter of interest is thus β. Our variable of interest, IQ, is a measure of national average intelligence. The data on IQ levels come from Vanhanen, 2002, 2006) who have compiled their dataset by averaging hundreds of IQ tests observed over the 20th and the 21st centuries for 113 countries using best practice methods. Average IQ is a measure of generalpurpose human capital as well as a measure of nation's labor quality (Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Jones and Schneider, 2006) . In institutional setting, we consider IQ as a measure of the ability of a nation's human capital to cooperate in order to produce a nationally ecient outcome in terms of pro-market policies.
We include the following control variables: openness to trade, natural resources exports, the log of GDP per capita, legal origin and geographical location. The model in equation (1) is estimated by means of 2SLS, to account for possible endogeneity that results from the inclusion of openness to trade. In fact, while greater openness increases the demand for better institutions, it may be true that countries with better institutions may be more open (Islam and Montenegro, 2002) . We use Frankel and Romer (1999) 's variables to instrument for trade.
Regression Results
We present the regression results in two subsections. In the rst subsection (section 4.1), intelligence enters exogenously the regression model for institutional quality. This follow the practice in growth regressions where IQ enters the model exogenously (Weede and Kämpf, 2002; Whetzel and McDaniel, 2006; Ram, 2007; Jones, 2011) even though it may be argued that growth can create conditions that allow the development of human capital. We then, in section 4.2, consider that institutional quality aect national intelligence by endogenously introducing IQ. Our adopted estimation strategy, the twostage least square, helps to account the the possible endogeneity of IQ in the model.
Results with IQ as an exogenous variable
The regression results are presented in Table 1 . Each of the columns (2)−(6) displays the estimated model for one of the ve institutional quality variables. Our coecient of interest,β, is positive and signicant at the 1% level in the regressions where the dependent variable is the rule of law, and at the 5% level in the other regressions. We thus nd that the positive eect of average IQ remains signicant after accounting for other determinants of institutional quality. This nding sugests that countries with higher IQ enjoy better government institutions.
We now turn to the performance of the other determinants of institutional quality when IQ is accounted for. First, Thirdly, regional dummies have a signicant and negative eect on institutional quality in most of the cases. For example, with exception for the Sub-Saharan African dummy, all the regional variables negatively aect the regulatory quality and the rule of law in the countries include in our sample. It is important to note that while the eect of the other regional dummies is negative, the one for Sub-Saharan Africa is positive, although signicant only for Political Stability and Voice and Accountability.
Finally, openness to trade has an unexpected sign in Table 1 . In addition, the coecient of this variable is signicant only for Rule of Law and for Voice and Accountability.
This nding seems puzzling. However, Kalonda-Kanyama (2012) shows that, when national IQ is accounted for, the relationship between institutional quality and trade may not be linear. Precisely, he nds a positive but diminishing relationship between three As this will be seen from the next section, considering IQ as an endogenous variable does not make any dierence in terms of the sign and the level of signicance of the estimated coecients in the regressions where Government Eciency and Regulatory Qualtity are the dependent variables, even though the estimated eect is higher when IQ is endogenous. In fact, comparing the results from Table 2 and Table 4 shows that the coecient associated with IQ is positive and equal to 0.048 when IQ is endogenous, and 0.037 when IQ exogenous in the regression with Government Eciency as the dependent variable. On the other hand, the estimated coecient is 0.039 when IQ is endogenous and 0.030 when IQ is exogenous in the regression with Regulatory Quality as the dependent variable.
Robustness Checks
To check the robustness of our ndings, we run the same regressions using the data for the year 2002 and report the results in Table 3 . Our coecient of interest,β, is positive and signicant in all the regressions that we report in Table 3 . All the control variables performed in the same way as in the ve regressions. For further robustness checks, we run the regressions in Table 1 with dierent control variables. First, we used the KOF index of economic globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008) instead of trade openness. We also use a dummy variable for high income countries instead of GDP per capita. We motivate the use of this dummy variable by the fact that citizen in countries with high income would demand better institutions. Finally, we use dummies for continents instead of the regional classication of countries. Table 4 shows that our variable of interest is signicant for all institutional quality variables, except for Voice and Accountability. Tables 3 and 4 conrm our earlier nding on the positive eect of intelligence, as measured by national average IQ, on institutional quality. An important implication of these results is that national intelligence has an indirect eect on economic growth, one channel of which is institutional quality, in addition to its direct eect that is extensively documented in the literature. In fact better institutions have a positive eect on economic growth.
Conclusion
This paper was mainly concerned with the eect of national level of IQ on dierent aspects of institutional quality. The main nding is that intelligence positively aect each of the ve measures of the quality of government institutions that we considered.
Therefore, countries with higher average IQ enjoy better government institutions. This nding should in no way be interpreted as an evidence that there exist some countries with more intelligent populations that build better institutions and some other countries with less intelligent populations that build poor institutions. What our nding points to is the fact that the level of cooperation of a country's human capital within its institutions is important. Modern institutions should be built to support pro-market and pro-trade policies, and national IQ score provide a measure of the degree of the support to such policies.
An important implication of our nding is that institutional quality is a crucial channel through which intelligence indirectly positively aects economic growth, in addition to its direct positive eect that is already extensively documented in the literature.
More specically, high population IQ positively aects institutional quality which, in turn, positively aects economic growth. The results in this paper line up with recent ndings of the eect of intelligence on political institutions (Jones, 2011) , corruption (Potrafke, 2012) and governance (Kodila-Tedika, 2012) . The paper's main contribution to the literature is that intelligence does indeed matter for the quality of government institutions. 
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